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Over‐Interpreting Functional Neuroimages 
 
Marc A. Burock 
 
 
Cognitive neuroscientists use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure 
properties of a participant’s brain during a cognitive task.  These imaging results are 
transformed into compelling pictures of brain activity using statistical models.  I will argue that, 
for a broad class of experiments, neuroimaging experts have a tendency to over‐interpret the 
functional significance of their data.  This over‐interpretation appears to follow from 
contentious theoretical assumptions about the mind‐brain connection, and from a propensity 
to conflate the anatomical location of a statistically‐significant correlation with knowledge of 
the mechanistic functioning at that location. 
 
 
1.  Introduction.  Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a tool used by cognitive 
neuroscientists to create the compelling pictures of brain activity that most of us have come 
across in the public media and lay press.  Although these pictures are taken as scientific facts, 
there is a growing concern within the fMRI community itself that the field lacks a degree of 
scientific rigor (Miller 2008).  A recent controversy brought this concern to a head, which began 
when the New York Times published a column describing an fMRI study on undecided voters 
prior to the 2008 U.S. presidential election (Iacoboni et al. 2007).  In this experiment, 
participants’ brains were scanned as they viewed pictures and videos of the major presidential 
candidates at the time.  The authors concluded, based largely upon patterns of measured brain 
activity, that “emotions about Hillary Clinton are mixed,” “Mitt Romney shows potential,” “John 
Edwards has promise—and a problem,” and “Barack Obama and John McCain have work to 
do.” 
     These claims created an immediate backlash within the fMRI community.  Russell Poldrack, a 
cognitive neuroscientist who uses fMRI, said of the study “It epitomized everything that a lot of 
us feel is wrong about where certain parts of the field are going, which is throw someone in a 
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scanner and tell a story about it” and that “people will start to see fMRI as neophrenology, just 
telling stories and not giving explanations.”   (Miller 2008, 1412) 
     Within the philosophy of science, Roskies (2007) has considered the evidential status of fMRI 
images as compared to photographs.  She concluded that proper interpretation of brain images 
involves far more than viewing a photograph, but suggests that neuroscientists familiar with 
fMRI would not misinterpret brain images in the ways she describes and that her findings are 
most relevant to the non‐expert public.  Racine et al. (2005) argues similarly that the public sees 
neuroimaging results without understanding the limitations and complexities of the work, 
which leads readily to misinterpretations.  The public aside, fMRI experts, who presumably 
understand the methodology involved in creating functional brain images, can also misinterpret 
fMRI study results—at least according to Poldrack and others.  While experts commonly 
disagree, it is not common for parts of a scientific community to feel or fear that its 
practitioners are heading toward pseudoscience and story‐telling.  There appears to be a 
fundamental conceptual problem at work.    
      In this paper I will attempt to analyze ways in which an fMRI expert may over‐interpret her 
data.  I will assume that some form of scientific induction is valid.  By over‐interpret I mean that 
she makes inferences that go beyond the quantitative meaning of a brain image, or draws 
inferences based upon the data in conjunction with contentious theoretical assumptions.  I 
realize that this former sense of over‐interpretation is vague and I will demonstrate it more 
clearly below.  Put briefly, functional brain images directly represent mathematical constructs 
and not physical processes.  When the quantitative nature of a brain image is carefully 
considered, I will argue that it says nothing directly about brain function. 
      With regard to the second sense of over‐interpretation, I will focus upon an fMRI expert’s 
philosophical assumptions about the mind‐brain problem and show how these assumptions can 
influence scientific inferences.  I expect an immediate reply that cognitive neuroscientists, as 
scientists, do not hold particular positions on the mind‐brain problem or that they place these 
assumptions aside while following a scientific method.  Perhaps that is true, yet cognitive 
neuroscientists do attempt to understand the mental by studying the brain in the first place—
must they not consider cognition and brain related in some way a priori, even if that relation is 
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a naïve reduction?   I will not belabor this argument.  While it is certainly possible that a 
cognitive neuroscientist holds no identifiable theoretical stance on the mind‐brain problem, I 
will focus upon those who do.  
     Of course I will not be able to discover exactly what theories, if any, are being used by the 
fMRI community as a whole.  Instead I will consider, as a model, one particular researcher who 
is prominent and respected in the fMRI community for her rigorous methods—Nancy 
Kanwisher.  She is currently a professor of cognitive neuroscience at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, a member of the National Academy of Sciences, and has used 
functional MRI for over a decade to study visual perception.  She is anything but a straw man, 
and has even criticized other members of the fMRI community for their lack of rigor (Vul and 
Kanwisher, in press).  I will attempt to understand her assumptions and inferences through her 
written work, focusing on her human fMRI experiments involving face‐stimuli. 
 
 2.  Technical Background.  Before we can appreciate Kanwisher’s philosophical assumptions 
and scientific assertions, it will be necessary to understand how functional brain images are 
created.  There are two technical parts: (1) the biophysics of magnetic resonance imaging, and 
(2) the mathematical procedures that transform a ‘raw’ measurement into a picture.   For the 
purposes of this paper, I will focus upon (2) because it concerns our argument, and only briefly 
address (1) as it does not and has been discussed before in the philosophy of science by Roskies 
(2007). 
     Some understanding of (1) is necessary before I proceed.  The fMRI signal is a consequence 
of the magnetic properties of water protons as they interact with the magnetic properties of 
hemoglobin.  Since oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin in the blood have different 
magnetic properties, the fMRI signal will covary with the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated 
hemoglobin at each brain location, producing the so‐called Blood Oxygen Level Dependent 
(BOLD) response.  The oxygenation ratio is dependent upon the metabolic demands of cortical 
tissue, thus the BOLD signal is associated with neuronal activity, although this relationship is not 
completely understood (Logothetis and Wandell 2004). 
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     Once the BOLD fMRI signal is measured, this data can be transformed into pictures.  The 
mathematical techniques for creating functional brain images derive largely from statistical 
modeling methods (Friston et al. 1995).  We begin with a raw dataset consisting of the BOLD 
fMRI signals measured at a discrete array of cuboid brain locations known as voxels.   Each 
voxel is associated with a discrete time series of BOLD fMRI measurements taken at fixed 
intervals during the course of the experiment.  The most common but certainly not the only 
way to analyze this dataset is by fitting each time series, voxel‐by‐voxel, with a linear model of 
the form , where is a column vector representing the measured BOLD times 
series at each voxel,  is an experimental design matrix with indicator variables representing 
different task or stimulus conditions,  is a vector of the unknown parameters to be estimated 
from the data, and  represents an unknown noise term.   
     Again,  is our BOLD measurement,  codifies our assumptions about the structure of the 
experiment, and  are the parameters that we are most interested in knowing, for these 
explain, in a condensed manner, the variability of .  Of course we cannot know  exactly—we 
can only estimate it from the data .  There are straightforward and mathematically rigorous 
ways of doing this, but we need not address these here.  Let us assume that we can calculate an 
estimate of . 
     In a two condition experiment, for instance, when one stimulus is a flashing checkerboard 
and the other is a dark screen, we would estimate two parameters  at each voxel, 
corresponding to the two stimulus conditions.  In the simplest case, and would represent 
the mean BOLD signal for each condition of the experiment.   We could generate an 
approximate map of ‘brain activity’ by visualizing the estimated difference between and 
divided by the standard error of this difference (the t‐statistic) at each voxel.     
     I have simplified things greatly, and have ignored the substantial technical hurdles involved 
in creating the reliable images that are presented to other scientists and the public.  As well, 
there are many other mathematical methods and models that may be applied to help 
understand an fMRI dataset, but the modeling illustrated above is the most commonly used 
method by cognitive neuroscientist to make inferences about brain function. 
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     For readers familiar with the concept of statistical correlation, there is a straightforward way 
to understand how fMRI pictures of brain activity can be created.  Let us take  to be a so‐
called ‘dummy’ stimulus vector constructed as below, along with  which is the BOLD fMRI 
time series measured during the experiment.  Further suppose that we removed any ‘artifacts’ 
from  such as those artifacts due to head motion. 
   and  
By calculating the linear correlation coefficient between  and ,  we can create a rough 
statistical map of ‘activation.’  Larger correlations will be called brain activity, assuming the 
correlations meet our test for statistical significance.  Again, I am not claiming that this is what 
researchers do—I only offer this example to explain, in greatly simplified terms, what fMRI 
activity represents from a quantitative perspective.  It is useful because it helps us to 
understand the basis for many other complicated mathematical techniques used in brain 
imaging.   
     In most fMRI experiments, brain activity means that  covaries with the stimulus 
condition.  This covariance or correlation is identified using a particular model.  I will often refer 
to fMRI brain activity as a correlation because correlation underlies the statistical tests of 
significance used to generate the brain images presented in scientific papers.  The images do 
not represent physical measurements; they represent, roughly, reliable correlations between 
indexed stimulus conditions and physical measurements. 
 
3.  Theoretical assumptions of an expert.  I will take ‘Functional imaging of human visual 
recognition’ by Kanwisher et al. [1996] as a starting point for this discussion.  Kanwisher’s 
experiments are classic in that they are stimulus‐response experiments where she determines, 
in advance, a set of well‐defined stimuli to be presented to the subject while measuring a 
neurophysiological property of that subject.  I think that these types of experiments are the 
least susceptible to interpretational difficulties and that Kanwisher’s are particularly lucid in 
that her stimuli are visual images. 
     The fMRI experiments of interest purportedly study human visual recognition proper, which 
according to Kanwisher et al. ”include[s] two main components: (i) the high‐level perceptual 
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analysis of a visual stimulus (for example, the construction of a structural description of an 
object’s shape), and (ii) the matching of that perceptual description to a stored visual 
representation in memory (e.g., determining that the shape looks more like a chair than a 
bicycle).  Note that this definition excludes both very ‘early’ visual processes such as edge 
extraction, and very ‘late’ processes such as accessing the name or meaning of a visually‐
presented stimulus.”  (1996, 55) 
     In part (i) we are told that visual recognition includes perceptual analysis exemplified by the 
construction of a structural description of an object’s shape, and in (ii) the matching of that 
perceptual description to a stored visual representation.  I am interested in the actions 
mentioned in this definition, specifically ‘perceptual analysis’, ‘construction’, and ‘matching’; 
and more urgently, who or what performs these actions.  The subject of the action is left blank, 
and we wonder whether it is the human participant as an agent who performs these actions, or 
if Kanwisher implies that the brain or specific brain regions perform these actions. 
    From other published literature, it becomes clear that Kanwisher holds that particular brain 
regions or collections of regions perform these actions.  She says, for instance, “…by 
demonstrating the extreme specificity of one cortical region for a single high‐level function—
face perception.”, “…fMRI has revealed a particular region in the human brain where this 
special face perception machinery apparently resides…”, “More generally, which functions get 
their own dedicated patch of cortex, and why?”, and “Thus, Tsao et al. provide the strongest 
evidence yet for extreme specificity of a cortical region for a complex high‐level function.” 
(Kanwisher 2006, 617) 
     We see two allusions to the high‐level function mentioned in the previous article.  It appears 
Kanwisher believes that brain tissue analyzes perceptions, constructs structural descriptions, 
and matches perceptual descriptions to stored visual representations.  If this were only a 
metaphoric way to express a research finding, then I would have no quarrel; however, these 
sorts of comments are prolific in the neuroimaging literature, and more, they are used in the 
rigorous definitions that circumscribe particular sub‐domains of cognitive neuroscience. 
     On the surface, attributing human activities, such as matching, to specific cortical regions 
sounds like anthropomorphism.  Human beings analyze perceptions, construct descriptions, 
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and match descriptions to representations; neurons ‘maintain’ a potential difference and 
‘generate’ action potentials.  Within a purely physical way of talking about things, it should not 
be said that brain tissue analyzes anything, for brain tissue does nothing but evolve its physical 
properties according to the laws of physics.  There may of course be localized ‘brain laws’, such 
as Kirkoff’s circuit laws for electronic circuits, but these local laws deal with the physical 
properties of circuits and have little to do with agent‐based functioning. 
     I believe that Kanwisher would deny the allegation of anthropomorphism of brain tissue, yet 
in the quotations above, she is in some way ‘placing’ human functions ‘into’ pieces of brain 
tissue.  For instance, we might conclude that face perception occurs ‘within’ a particular piece 
of brain tissue, or that a particular patch of tissue is solely responsible for face perception in‐
itself without any connection to other parts of the brain.  I do not believe that many cognitive 
neuroscientists would agree with these conclusions, but they follow from a casual reading of 
the above quotations. 
     Again, I am not denying the methodological rigor of Kanwisher’s fMRI research—which I 
believe is top‐notch—but I am questioning her underlying assumptions about the mind‐brain 
problem, and using her way of talking about her research as a model for how the field discusses 
functional brain‐imaging results as a whole.  Even if she does not intend my interpretation, her 
language can at least be construed as form of anthropomorphism of brain tissue.  She appears 
to be placing human characteristics into clumps of cells.   
     While I see anthropomorphism at work here, I realize that this would not be the common 
philosophical interpretation.  Given the quotes above, most philosophers would likely attribute 
cognitivism to Kanwisher’s theoretical stance in the general sense that she takes the brain to be 
similar to a digital computer, or that cognition is the product of algorithm‐like rules run on the 
brain machine.1   Her specific comment about special face‐perception machinery, localized to 
particular cortical areas, makes this position seem clear, and her broader use of a 
computational language supports it. 
                                                            
1 Cognitivism is two‐stage anthropomorphism.  Human beings constructively placed human 
functions—like mathematical calculation—within computers.  To take the computer algorithms 
and place them, metaphorically, into brain tissue is a form of anthropomorphism if we consider 
the human design of computers at the start. 
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     Kanwisher, if pressed for a philosophical stance on the mind‐brain problem, may say that as 
a scientist she is objectively neutral on the issue, but her language betrays a particular 
theoretical orientation that many philosophers will readily identify.  She may maintain that her 
language is metaphorical and has nothing to do with her science.  However, I will argue that her 
philosophical orientation to the mind‐brain problem, which appears to be some version of 
cognitivism, influences her scientific inferences and leads her to over‐interpret the data.  I will 
speculate that she is hardly alone. 
 
4.  Evaluating functional inferences.  A scientifically interesting stimulus‐response fMRI 
experiment demonstrates cortical brain regions that selectively respond to specific stimuli.  By 
this I mean, a cortical region is discovered to be relatively active if and only if a specific stimulus 
or class of stimuli are presented.  The if and only if clause is never established empirically, thus 
the researcher is content to test a pre‐chosen set of stimuli that contain a fair degree of 
variation.  Kanwisher does this for face stimuli in her 1997 paper, discovering a region of cortex 
that is a “module in extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception” (1997, 4302) where face 
perception involves detecting and representing faces.   This cortical area has been labeled the 
fusiform face area (FFA). 
     While I agree that the activity in the FFA is selectively correlated, in a statistical sense, with 
presented face images, it is not clear that we can infer any other facts from this observation 
without appealing to fundamental assumptions about the brain‐mind connection.  To make this 
concern solid, I will consider several functional inferences that may be endorsed given a 
rigorously performed stimulus‐response fMRI experiment.   I have chosen the inferences below 
for a variety of reasons.  The first inference I find logically tractable, the last is something I 
cannot refute, and the remaining are inferences likely to be endorsed by Kanwisher and others 
within the fMRI community.  Many other inferences are possible, but the following, taken as 
whole, demarcate my areas of concern.   
1.  The activity of FFA neurons is necessary and/or sufficient for the perception of faces. 
     I have not seen (1) explicitly endorsed by Kanwisher, but it is a tractable statement she might 
defend, especially since she identifies the FFA as the locus of face perception.  Yet if the only 
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evidence we have available derives from a stimulus‐response fMRI experiment, then we have 
no ground to defend (1).  This data does not logically determine the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the perception of faces, for it is possible that a subject without the correlations 
identified by Kanwisher perceives faces just fine, and that someone with these FFA correlations 
cannot perceive faces at all.  Her experiment offers nothing to rule‐out these possibilities, and 
thus (1) cannot be endorsed on the basis of a stimulus‐response fMRI experiment alone, at 
least not until some greater scientific fact connects these correlations to necessary and 
sufficient conditions.   
 
2. The activity of FFA neurons represents the face stimulus. 
     There is some evidence that Kanwisher takes this position to be true.  In demarcating the 
scientific study of visual recognition, she gives as an example the high‐level function, 
“construction of a structural description of an object’s shape,” (1996, 55) and states elsewhere 
that high‐level functions occur within a patch of cortical tissue.   A structural description of an 
object is a representation of that object.  Therefore, one might conclude that the neuronal 
activity in the FFA represents faces.   But to whom does the FFA re‐present?  Does it represent 
it to the experimenter? Does it represent a face to the subject’s brain as a whole?  If so, what 
does that mean?  
     There are those who study neuronal activity at the level of action potentials who have 
rigorously considered the representational capacity of neurons.  An excellent survey of this 
research and its results can be found in the book Spikes by Rieke et al. [1999].  These authors 
consider the temporal sequence of neuronal action potentials (spike trains), and how they can 
be quantitatively related to stimuli.  Unlike many cognitive neuroscientists, these authors 
explicitly state their theoretical assumptions about the mind‐brain problem, explaining that 
they are taking a homuncular view of representation as a starting point for mathematical 
analysis.  This does not detract from their results.  They are in no way claiming, as a scientific 
fact, that neuronal activity represents perceptual stimuli.  Rather, they ask, what is the 
representational capacity of neuronal activity given a homuncular perspective? 
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     In contrast, the selective activity in an fMRI experiment does not, by itself, establish that a 
particular cortical region represents anything, for the mathematics involved in computing 
selective correlations and the statistical models that identify ‘active’ brain regions have nothing 
to do with analyzing the structure of the fMRI signal for its representational capacity.   
Kanwisher may attempt these calculations for fMRI time series, but she has not done so to my 
knowledge.   
     Further, representational capacity and the act of representing are two different things.  The 
former is quantitatively tractable within the neurosciences while the latter currently is not.   
Even if localized activity did represent the stimulus in question, we would still have to consider 
the meaning of this representation from a mind‐brain perspective.  I imagine that many 
cognitive neuroscientists would say that the activity represents the stimulus to the brain, 
implicitly equating the whole brain with the homunculus.  One may of course elaborate a 
specific theory that attempts to eliminate the homunculus altogether, and with it, the idea that 
neuronal activity represents stimuli, but then we would agree that (2) is an unjustified scientific 
inference. 
     An analogy within the field of dendrochronology—the science of tree‐ring dating—may be 
helpful.    While tree‐rings represent the age of the tree to an observing dendrochronologist, it 
is another thing to say that the tree‐rings represent the age of the tree to the tree itself.  
Rather, the tree appears quite oblivious to its number of rings and the concept of number 
altogether.  Although a brain may possess an unspecified self‐representational capacity, it is far 
from certain that the physical matter of the brain can or does interpret its own physical 
properties as representations.   
      A cognitive neuroscientist has no ground to endorse (2) given only the selective activity 
derived from an fMRI stimulus‐response experiment, for these data do not address the problem 
of representation at all.  More, any claim of representing almost certainly involves a particular 
philosophical stance on the mind‐brain problem, thus the scientist cannot claim to be 
objectivity neutral to the mind‐brain connection and still endorse (2). 
 
3. The activity of FFA neurons indicates when a face is being perceived. 
Copyright 2009  Marc Burock   
     The homuncular problem arises once again.  Indicates to whom? The brain? The 
experimenter?  I am not denying that the selective activity found in an fMRI experiment is 
useful.  There are ways of using this data for practical purposes.  For instance, given a pattern of 
fMRI activity for a single subject, we may be able to predict the stimulus that accompanied that 
activity.  This is a fun trick.  Langleben et al. [2005] used it for lie detection.   As well, given a 
stimulus, one may predict the pattern of fMRI activity as Mitchell et al. [2008] did for pictured 
nouns.  These pragmatic uses of fMRI activity are technologically exciting, but they are also 
completely blind to the mind‐brain problem, the nature of the brain, and the nature of the 
mind.  In other words, our ability to make these predictions does not require that we 
understand the structure or function of the mind or brain. 
     Predicative uses of fMRI activity are performed using the mathematical tools discovered in 
the field of pattern classification (see Webb 2002 for an intro to these tools).  So long as the 
variability in stimuli is correlated with the variability of fMRI signals, we will be able to use 
classification algorithms to relate the two.  To use these algorithms, nothing need be known—
or assumed—about the mind or brain.  The measured activity becomes a meaningless vector of 
numbers associated with an indexed class of stimuli.  A computer scientist need not even know 
what the numbers represent in order to perform these classifications.   If the vectors 
statistically differ by class, she will be able to perform these neat predications.  While the 
activity of cortical neurons may statistically indicate to an outside observer when a particular 
stimulus is present, that indication does not imply that the activity plays the same role within 
the perceiver.  This role requires an inner homunculus to view these patterns and to signal an 
alarm.  The statement in (3) may be endorsed with the following changes:   These cortical 
neurons (probabilistically) indicate (to an outside observer) when a face stimulus was presented 
to the observing subject. 
 
4.  FFA neurons perform a high‐level function (face perception). 
     Kanwisher does make statements nearly identical to (4).  But neurons do not perceive faces, 
people perceive faces.  And her data is silent as to the mechanistic functioning of the FFA—she 
has only suggested where a hypothetical mechanism might exist, if it exists at all.  Nor would 
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the FFA alone make the perception of faces possible, and her experimental data cannot 
establish that the FFA is even necessary for face perception.   
     When supporting (4), I believe that Kanwisher would make the following argument based 
upon the results of a functional imaging experiment: 
Data : Simultaneous BOLD fMRI signals and face/non‐face stimuli 
Statistical Inference : The FFA is a region where the BOLD signals and stimuli are selectively 
correlated 
Functional Inference: The FFA performs face perception (because the BOLD signals and 
stimuli are selectively correlated within the FFA) 
But the functional inference is circular because the FFA is defined as the region where face 
stimuli and signals are correlated.   To refute the circularity of the functional inference, 
Kanwisher must use evidence other than the correlations or appeal to assumptions outside of 
the data.  Since fMRI experiments of this type provide no other evidence, the functional 
inference must be based upon an unspecified assumption.  Kanwisher is simply making a 
circular or speculative inference when she endorses something like (4) given her findings of 
selective fMRI correlations.   
 
5.  FFA neurons ‘process’ or ‘convey’ face information. 
     It is quite in vogue, within the fMRI community and the field of cognitive neuroscience, to 
say that particular cortical areas process different kinds of information.  For instance, Kanwisher 
might argue that the FFA processes facial information.  But what exactly do she and other 
neuroscientists mean when they make such claims?  It is well known that “information is 
notoriously a polymorphic phenomenon and polysemantic concept” (Floridi  2008), so a 
scientific fact couched in the language of information, without further specification, is 
ambiguous at best. 
     Again, we can contrast this casual use of information in (5) with that used by the authors of 
Spikes.  They use Claude Shannon’s (1948) mathematical theory of communication (aka 
mathematical information theory) to estimate the information transmission‐rate of a spike train 
about a stimulus.  Like pattern classification algorithms, these methods are blind to the 
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semantic or biologically relevant meaning of a spike‐train.  A thorough mathematical 
explanation of communication theory is beyond the scope of this work.  Briefly, imagine that an 
outside stimulus is communicated to the biological organism in the form of a spike train.  Given 
noisy communication between environment and organism, receiving a message (a spike train) 
reduces the organism’s uncertainty about the transmitted message (the stimulus).  At best, 
receiving a particular spike train will tell it exactly what stimulus was sent.  At worst, reception 
of the spike train tells it nothing about the stimulus. 
    Rieke et al. derive, with clearly specified assumptions, theoretical bounds on the 
informational carrying capacity of spike trains, and show that these bounds are nearly met in 
some situations.  From the perspective of a homunculus or outside observer, we may say that 
spike trains have the capacity to communicate information about the environment, and near 
optimally so—a result I find fascinating.  However, this result does not imply that we 
understand a brain mechanism; rather, Rieke et al. have identified a capacity given a 
homuncular perspective.  When we take a homuncular perspective and use the word 
information in Shannon’s quantitative sense, we can unambiguously claim that cortical neurons 
have the capacity to convey information.  Few authors of neuroimaging experiments explicitly 
state this position or make use of mathematical communication theory. 
   Although I accept Rieke’s notion of information transmission applied to the neurosciences, 
does  selective activity in a neuroimaging experiment demonstrate that specific patches of brain 
tissue ‘process’ specific kinds of information?  Can we say that the FFA processes face 
information?  In a very general way we may say this, in the sense that the FFA receives spike 
train inputs and produces spike train outputs.  Yet every region of the brain presumably 
processes face information in this sense.  Primary visual cortex has inputs and produces outputs 
to face stimuli.  Kanwisher may point out that the FFA selectively responds to face stimuli, 
whereas primary visual cortex is non‐selective.  She would like to infer that the FFA processes 
face and only face information, but the selective activity of an fMRI experiment cannot, by 
itself, establish this fact.  I say this because we have no idea what the FFA is doing—we only 
know that BOLD measurable activity is correlated with the presentation of face/non‐face 
signals.  If one takes selective correlations to be equivalent with “face information processing,” 
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then I have no argument.  If, however, “face information processing” is a scientific fact beyond 
a measurable correlation, then we would like to know what additional assumptions are needed 
to establish this fact. 
     Given the ambiguous meaning of information, it is difficult to know what a scientist is talking 
about when she uses this word to describe her scientific facts.  In Kanwisher et al. (1996) there 
is evidence that she equates visual information with the various quantifiable ways that one may 
describe a visual object.  For example, visual information can be the spatial relations between 
features, the orientation of the object, the color of the object, the luminance, the outline or 
shape, the complexity, or the spatial frequency content.  I believe that attributing face 
information processing to the FFA, in Kanwisher’s sense, is similar to saying that the FFA 
calculates, or represents, the quantifiable properties of a face image.  But an fMRI stimulus‐
response study does not demonstrate any mechanism of calculation, and the problem of 
representation was discussed in (3). 
 
6. The activity of FFA neurons is selectively correlated with face stimuli, but is functionally 
irrelevant. 
     In an fMRI stimulus‐response experiment, where the inferences follow from correlations 
between stimuli and BOLD signals, nothing rules out the possibility that those correlations are 
accidental—not in the sense that the correlations are statistically spurious, but that those 
correlations are functionally irrelevant to the stimuli of interest.  As an analogy, suppose my 
computer has a CPU fan with a blue LED light on the fan.  The light, however, is unlit and the fan 
isn’t spinning.  It happens that when I kick my computer just so on the left side of the front 
cover, the LED lights up, the fan begins spinning but stops after a second or two, and the light 
goes out.  If I kick it again, just so, it starts up for a second then stops.  I can reliably cause the 
fan to turn on for a bit.  When I kick the computer in other places, or shake it up, or sing to it, 
nothing happens to the fan.  The fan is selectively correlated with a specific kick.  Perhaps there 
are hundreds of computers, constructed at the same factory, that behave similarly.  This 
apparently causal relationship does not imply that the fan is functionally relevant to my kicking, 
or processes kicking information, or represents kicking.  In fact, my kicking and the fan are, as 
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Aristotle might say, accidentally related.  Given only the selective correlations of a 
neuroimaging study, it is possible that the FFA is functionally irrelevant with respect to face 
stimuli.   
 
5.  Concluding remarks.  A subsequent lesion study has shown that FFA damage is associated 
with an impaired ability to make facial judgments (Barton et al. 2002), while other fMRI studies 
challenge the idea that the FFA selectively responds to faces at all (Gauthier et al. 2000) and 
demonstrate that FFA activation is not sufficient for face perception (Hasson et al. 2003).  
Whatever future research may come, Kanwisher’s scientific fact—that the BOLD fMRI signal in 
the FFA is relatively greater when face stimuli are presented as compared to a variety of non‐
face stimuli—will remain intact.  This fact has already guided subsequent research.  It does not 
follow that we understand anything about a brain mechanism from this fact or that we are 
justified in making inferences 1‐5 as above, at least not without dogmatically asserting a 
particular stance on the mind‐brain connection or using ambiguous language. 
     I believe that Kanwisher and many others within the fMRI community assume some form of 
cognitivism (which is unlikely to be a great surprise).  This assumption, however, is 
philosophically contentious and scientifically unneeded, and more worrisome, invites the use of 
a metaphorical computational language to describe neuroimaging findings, leading to over‐
interpretation.  I have also seen evidence that Kanwisher implicitly takes the whole brain to be 
a homunculus of sorts without specifying what this means.  Racine et al. (2005) observed a 
similar trend in the popular media, calling this practice ‘neuro‐essentialism,’ which they define 
as equating subjectivity and personal identity to the brain.  I have called this a form of 
anthropomorphism. 
      Perhaps the primary source of over‐interpretation follows from Kanwisher’s tendency to 
conflate the anatomical location of a statistically‐significant correlation with knowledge of the 
mechanistic functioning at that location.  But Kanwisher’s use of fMRI data is mechanistically 
and functionally silent.  I say this because after she infers the locations of significant 
correlations and states precisely what two things are being correlated, she sets the data aside 
and focuses upon the derived pictures.  She does not use the data to further our understanding 
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of a mechanism or function; rather, she infers that the correlation‐selected location performs a 
mechanistic function because stimuli and fMRI BOLD signals were correlated at that location.  
Put this way, the reasoning appears circular.   
     I chose to analyze Kanwisher’s fMRI face‐stimuli experiments because her subject matter, 
the visual face, is relatively well‐defined and less open to interpretational difficulties.  Contrast 
her work with, for example, a paper that used fMRI to investigate emotions while making moral 
judgments (Greene et al., 2001).  In this work the fMRI BOLD signal was measured on 
participants as they read 60 ‘practical dilemmas’ that were divided into moral and non‐moral 
categories, during which the participants judged the ‘appropriateness’ of a suggested action 
one might perform in the given scenario.  Finding selectively‐correlated differences for 
categories and judgments, the authors concluded that the spectrum of moral dilemmas 
differentially engages emotional processing and that this finding illuminates issues in moral 
philosophy.  Although this work was published in the prestigious journal Science, once we see 
the interpretational difficulties involved with Kanwisher’s lucid experiments, we cannot help 
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